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Abstract
Why do ﬁrms delegate job design decisions to workers and what are the im-
plications of such delegation? We develop a private-information based theory of
delegation where delegation provides a more eﬃcient allocation of talent inside the
ﬁrm, but at the cost that low ability workers must be compensated to self-sort. Ca-
reer concerns limit the eﬀectiveness of delegation: when returns to ability or market
observability of job content are high, the compensation needed to get low-ability
workers to self-sort is high, and ﬁrms limit delegation to avoid cream-skimming of
the high-ability workers. We investigate implications for how misallocation of tal-
ent within ﬁrms may occur, the optimal design of incentive contracts, and which
decisions are more likely to be delegated to subordinates.
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11 Introduction
The traditional method of job design, as evidenced by hiring procedures in government
bureaucracies, is to ﬁrst deﬁne the activities contained in the job slots and then to hire
suitable workers (or to reallocate existing workers) to ﬁll those slots. This gives workers
limited discretion in designing their job. In recent years, this bureaucratic, top-down,
solution to the job design problem has been challenged. For example, the engineering
company Sun Hydraulics gives employees “the right and responsibility to choose how
they spend their time,” and Gore & Ass., the producer of Gore-Tex c ° products, encourages
“maximum freedom for each employee” (as described by Baron & Kreps, 1999). While
these two examples are extreme, the delegated job design practices of Sun and Gore are
part of mainstream managerial thinking as evidenced by a burgeoning empirical literature
(e.g., Caroli et al., 2001, OECD 1999, and Rajan & Wulf, 2003). This literature documents
the widespread use of practices such as job rotation, matrices, and self-monitoring groups,
which all may be seen as increased delegation and ﬂexibility used by ﬁrms when designing
jobs.1
Why do ﬁrms delegate job design to workers? Why do diﬀerent ﬁrms or industries
practice diﬀerent degrees of delegation? Several aspects may be relevant. For example,
delegation can reduce managerial overload. Or workers simply enjoy the freedom implied
by delegation and are willing to take a pay cut to obtain it, as may be the case in
academics.
While these issues may be important, we wish here to develop a theory of delegation
with worker private information and career concerns as the key ingredients. To motivate,
workers may have private information about whether they are creative or not, a character-
istic that is notoriously diﬃcult to capture with for example personality tests. Or workers
may have better knowledge of customer tastes than the manager. Career concerns mean
that the job design decision today aﬀects a worker’s welfare tomorrow. For example, if the
1For example, Caroli et al. (2001) states: “With more decentralized ﬁrms and more small businesses
the organizational picture of western economies is changing. This is to be contrasted with the previously
dominant scheme, based on a Taylorist tradition, which emphasized the advantage of setting precise norms
and closely monitoring workers through their specialization in conception and execution activities.” (p.
482).
2most able workers in a hi-tech ﬁrm are engaged in product development, then low ability
workers also engaged in product development may have better future prospects than low
ability workers engaged in say product updating, since the market may (correctly) view
job description as an indicator of ability. Or if the leading analysts use a new and complex
market analysis tool, then other analysts may have better future prospects if they also use
this tool. One example is stock market analysts during the recent dot-com boom, who
started using valuation techniques based more on vague estimates of growth prospects
rather than perhaps more precise estimates based on current cash ﬂow and systemic risks.
Analysts that did not approve of these new techniques were viewed as out of date.2
The basic tension stems from two eﬀects of private information. On one hand, private
information favors delegation since workers are better equipped to know what they should
do, or how to do it. On the other hand, private information means that workers may have
incentives to engage in wasteful signalling activities under delegation, to reap private
beneﬁts. For example, less able workers may engage in product development to herd
in with the high ability workers and improve their own future prospects. Or less able
analysts may use an analysis tool currently in mode, to give the market the impression
that they are of high ability.
How much should ﬁrms delegate given these two opposing eﬀects? To anticipate, the
main cost from delegation is that low ability workers need to be compensated to self-sort
eﬃciently, that is to choose activities with low returns to ability. When career concerns are
less important (its determinants are discussed later), an internal labor market emerges
where a ﬁrm sets a small premium for such activities coupled with a high degree of
delegation. When career concerns are more important, the required self-sorting premium
to low ability workers becomes high. In that case, outside ﬁrms can cream-skim the high
ability workers, and a high degree of delegation would be unproﬁtable. To avoid the
cream-skimming problem, the ﬁrm needs to reduce the premium necessary to compensate
the low workers to self-sort. It obtains this by reducing the career concerns through
limiting delegation and instead assigning workers to activities.
Our main message is therefore that when career concerns are weak, ﬁrms can opt for
a liberal delegation practice, and when the career concerns are strong, ﬁrms should opt
2History showed of course that there were good reasons to be suspicious of these valuation methods.
3for the traditional emphasis on centralized, top-down job design. This message stands in
contrast to Holmstrom (1982/1999), which emphasizes the beneﬁcial incentive eﬀects of
career concerns on agency costs. In the present setting, career concerns is the dark force
that creates agency costs and necessitates limits to delegation.
Our model is based on a simple version of the classic Roy (1951) model. Workers are
of two possible ability levels, and there are two activities, the “easy” and the “diﬃcult”.
These activities may be thought of as diﬀerent tasks or as diﬀerent methods in performing
t h es a m et a s k .A ne ﬃcient allocation of workers occurs when the low (high) ability workers
specialize in the easy (diﬃcult) activity. By job design we mean the decision about which
activity a worker should specialize in. There are two periods. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms
oﬀer one-period contracts to the workers, which specify degree of delegation and pay for
the diﬀerent activities, and workers choose which ﬁrm to work for. Before the second
period, the ﬁrms make oﬀers to each worker conditional on their knowledge about ability,
and workers accept the highest oﬀer.
Let us summarize the main results. Under some circumstances there exist an eﬃcient,
separating, equilibrium where ﬁrms fully delegate the job design decision to workers, and
a compensation scheme is structured so that workers do so eﬃciently. Such a scheme
involves paying the low ability workers a premium to self-sort, i.e., pay above marginal
productivity. A separating equilibrium resembles play in companies such as Sun Hy-
draulics and Gore & Ass., in that job design to a large extent is decided by the employees
rather than by a manager.
When a separating equilibrium does not exist, there exist an assignment equilibrium
where only a fraction of employees (which may be equal to zero and hence encompasses
pooling) are delegated the job design decision, and the remaining fraction of employees
have their jobs assigned by the manager. A rationing equilibrium with a high degree of
assignment resembles play in bureaucracies, with little or no delegation, while a rationing
equilibrium with a moderate degree of assignment resembles play in “typical” ﬁrms, where
only a fraction of workers are delegated the job design.
Which equilibrium occurs depends on the strength of workers career concerns. When
returns to ability are high, it is more tempting for a low ability worker to imitate a high
ability worker (since the future wage diﬀerential is high between workers that are probably
4high ability and workers that are probably low ability) and the premium required to make
low ability workers self-sort is high. Such a high premium makes the threat of cream-
skimming the high workers stronger, and as a result workers will be delegated less in
equilibrium. Likewise, when the market observability of worker activity is higher, the
compensation needed to make low workers self-sort becomes higher, and cream-skimming
is more of a threat. In essence, stronger career concerns implies that workers are delegated
less decision-making authority. In addition, a high cost of misallocating a low worker (the
“Peter’s cost”) will make the ﬁrm more willing to pay the self-sort premium, which results
in a higher degree of delegation.
The limits to delegation in rationing equilibria imply that the workers’ private infor-
mation is not used eﬃciently, and a misallocation of workers therefore occurs. One may
think that the greatest source of misallocation arising from assignment would be able
workers that are not permitted to do the diﬃcult activity. It turns out, however, that the
ineﬃciency invoked by optimal behavior of ﬁrms in our model is the opposite: low workers
are assigned to the diﬃcult activity. This result accords with the Peter principle,3 in that
misallocation occurs due to workers being allocated to activities above their competence
level (rather than able workers being occupied below their competence level).
G i v e nt h ec o n c e r n st h a tah i g hd e g r e eo fd e l e g a t i o nc a nm a k ej o bd e s i g na( w a s t e f u l )
signalling activity, one would expect that the degree of delegation and the degree of
misallocation of labor input would be positively related. However, when taking into
account the contractual response by ﬁrms to the signalling motive, that is in equilibrium,
we ﬁnd that more delegation is associated with less misallocation. Hence while it may be
true that more delegation leads to more misallocation for a given ﬁrm at the margin, the
hypothesis we obtain for a cross-section of ﬁrms is a negative relation between the degree
of delegation and the degree of misallocation.
Theories of delegation have focused on situations where only one decision can be dele-
gated. Our results give some hints as to which decisions will be delegated to agents. These
will be activities where the returns to talent are low, or where the market observability is
low. In short, activities that are less prone to harmful signalling activity will be delegated.
3The Peter’s principle (Peter & Hull, 1969) states that in a hierarcy, employees are promoted to their
incompetence level.
5For example, since work method of a worker is probably less observable than task choice,
we can conjecture that ﬁrms are more prone to delegate work method decisions than task
choice decisions.
The job design literature, Holmstrom & Milgrom (1991), Prendergast (1999), and
Olsen & Torsvik (2000), among others, asks which combination of tasks should be in-
cluded in the description of a job, where monitoring and production technology are prime
determinants, and how to give incentives such that workers undertake those activities.
There are two main diﬀerences between this literature and the current paper. There is a
technological diﬀerence in that we consider a situation where the ﬁrm attempts to make
workers specialize eﬃciently, while the job design literature considers settings where ﬁrms
attempt to make workers spread their eﬀort on several tasks. More importantly, due to
lack of worker private information, the job design literature has no notion of attempting to
draw on worker’s competence in designing jobs. Similarly, the job assignment literature,
which includes Rosen (1982) and Gibbons & Waldman (1999a), considers settings where
workers and ﬁrms have symmetric information at the hiring stage, circumstances under
which there would be no advantage of delegating the activity choice decision. The same
point applies to the literature on career concerns, as in Holmstrom (1982/1999).
The delegation literature, which spans areas in political economy, monetary economics,
industrial organization, and economics of organization, has emphasized other motivations
of delegation than private information, such as reducing managerial overload (Milgrom &
Roberts, 1992, Aoki 1986), costly writing of contracts (Marschak & Reichelstein, 1998),
delegation as a commitment device (Fershtman and Judd, 1986), or that workers may
have private beneﬁts from delegation which induces harder work (Aghion & Tirole, 1997,
Baker et al., 1999, and Zabojnik, 2001). Prendergast (2002) considers the interaction
between delegation and incentive contracts when worker private information may justify
delegation. There are some clear diﬀerences to the present paper. For example, Pren-
dergast’s setting is static, which excludes career concerns, and the principal puts limits
t od e l e g a t i o nb e c a u s es h em a yb ew e l l - i n f o r m e da b o u tw h i c hp r o j e c tt h ew o r k e rs h o u l d
attend to. In contrast, we take the degree of information asymmetry as given. Other
papers with private information as an ingredient in the delegation choice includes Laﬀont
& Martimort (1998) on the costs of communication and collusion between agents, and
6Faure-Grimaud et al. (2002) on the equivalence between centralization and delegation in
aL a ﬀont-Martimort type of setting. Dessein (2002) shows that the equivalence no longer
holds in a setting where the principal cannot commit to a reward scheme as a function of
the agent’s messages.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 considers
t h ec a s ew h e r eﬁrms have symmetric information about worker ability at all stages, and
Section 4 considers the case with asymmetric information before bidding in the second
period. In Section 5, we relate our theory to some evidence, discuss misallocation of talent
within ﬁrms, discuss which decisions are more likely to be delegated to subordinates.
Section 6 extends the model to allow for performance contracts, and Section 7 concludes.
2 The basic model
Here we ﬁrst describe the technology and contracts of the model, and then the timing.
2.1 Technology and contracts
There is a continuum of workers and several ﬁrms, for simplicity taken to equal two.
Each worker privately knows whether he has either low or high ability, while only the
share of high ability workers, θ ∈ (0,1), is publicly known.4 In each ﬁrm, there are two
possible activities for a worker; the “easy” and the “diﬃcult”, denoted by E and D. Both
workers have productivity π0 in the E activity. In the D activity, however, the low type
has productivity πL, and the high type has productivity πH.W ec o n ﬁne attention to the
case where it is eﬃcient that high workers are allocated to D and that low workers are
allocated to E, that is when πL < π0 < πH. We emphasize that the diﬀerent “activities”
can be interpreted as diﬀerent tasks (e.g. product development vs. product updating), or
they can be interpreted as diﬀerent work methods in doing the same task (e.g., using an
old or a new work method in designing products).
4Papers that support this notion of asymmetric information in labor markets include Acemoglu &
Pischke’s 1998 study of apprenticeship in Germany, and Foster & Rosenzweig (1996) on allocation of
workers to tasks in agricultural Philippines.
7We assume for the moment that measures of performance is suﬃciently noisy to pre-
clude the use of individual or group performance contracts. Contract oﬀers must then
simply consist of one wage wD
1 for the D activity, one wage wE
1 for the E activity, and the
degree of delegation d.5 The variable d may alternatively be viewed as the probability of
a worker given full delegation once inside the ﬁrm, or the probability of a given worker
being oﬀered a full-delegation contract. In Section 6, we extend the our analysis to al-
low for individual performance contracts, to analyze the interaction between the implicit
incentives created by career concerns and the explicit incentives created by performance
contracts.
All workers and ﬁrms are risk neutral and have discount factors equal to one. We
assume that if the wage oﬀers are such that a worker is indiﬀerent between doing the E
activity or the D activity (taking into account the implicit incentives) and he is delegated
the choice, then he will choose the eﬃcient activity. This may be due to an (unmodeled)
option plan or ownership share, or alternatively due to increased job satisfaction in the
eﬃcient activity. The equilibria we construct will use this tie-breaking rule quite exten-
sively, since both low and high type workers will be indiﬀerent between the wage contracts
oﬀered. One may therefore suspect that we obtain knife-edge results. The robustness of
our results are discussed in Section 6 (performance contracts), where indiﬀerence only
h o l d sf o rt h el o wt y p e .
2.2 Timing
In the ﬁrst period, workers are born knowing their ability level, and ﬁrms compete in
attracting workers. Firms can only commit to contracts lasting one period. A ﬁrm oﬀers
workers a contract {wD
1 , wE
1 ,d}. Given the oﬀers, workers accept an oﬀer, which binds
them to a ﬁrm for one period.
Importantly, before workers engage in production (but after they have chosen which
ﬁrm to work for) a ﬁrm has the option to raise any of the wages {wD
1 , wE
1 }o ﬀered, and
allow workers to switch activities. In other words, ﬁrms can commit to not lowering
5I tm a ys e e mo d dt h a ta no ﬀer by a ﬁrm is a vector of wages, rather than just a wage. However, we
can interpret the vector as reﬂecting diﬀerences in overtime payment or fringe beneﬁts between the two
possible tasks.
8wages or to delegate less, but may in the interim choose to raise one of the wages and
allow more delegation. This is a natural requirement, because both the ﬁrm and workers
would (weakly) prefer such a reneged contract.6 Although such wage raises do not occur
in equilibrium, it will turn out to have an impact on equilibrium, through aﬀecting which
{wD
1 , wE
1 , d} combinations that can credibly be oﬀered. Workers are then either assigned
to an activity or delegated the choice, and ﬁnally production takes place.
After the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrms bid for the workers according to a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid
auction and workers accept the highest oﬀer.7 The expected wages in the second period
conditional on activity in the ﬁrst period are denoted by wD
2 and wE
2 .
3 Symmetrically informed ﬁrms
We now consider the benchmark case when the inside and the outside ﬁrm are symmet-
rically informed about the ﬁrst period activity of a worker before bidding in the second
p e r i o d .T h i sa l l o w su st oe x p l o r et h er o l eo ft e c h n o l o g y( t h eπ’s) in delegation.8
F i r s tw ef o c u so nseparating equilibria,w h e r ed =1and both types of employees work
on their appropriate activity in period 1, and then on rationing equilibria,w h e r ed<1
and (a fraction of) employees work on the wrong activity in period 1.N o t et h a tt h e r ei s
no incentive for worker misrepresentation in the second period, and hence ineﬃciencies,
if they occur, do so in the ﬁrst period.9
3.1 Separating equilibrium
We now analyze the separating equilibrium that occurs when workers self-sort to their
appropriate activity.
6In technical terms, we are imposing the criterion of renegotiation-proofness.
7Under symmetric information between ﬁrms before the bidding, virtually any auction will give the
same equilibrium wages. Under asymmetric information the auction plays a role. This is discussed in
Section 4.
8Throughout, we view the production technology of the ﬁrm as exogenous. A richer analysis would
take into account that such technology can be endogenous.
9The model can be extended to cover an arbitrary number of periods, in which case there can be
ineﬃciencies in all periods except the last one.
9When the sorting is eﬃc i e n ta tt i m e1 ,b o t hﬁrms know a worker’s ability before the
second period. We therefore have that,
Remark 1 Given that a separating equilibrium is played,
wE
2 = π0, wD
2 = πH.
Proof. I fw o r k e r sa l l o c a t et h e m s e l v e se ﬃciently, ability is revealed and bidding in the
second period implies the remark.
A worker that chooses the diﬃcult activity in the ﬁr s tp e r i o de n j o y sb e t t e rc a r e e r
prospects than a worker that chooses the easy activity in the ﬁrst period, since the outside
ﬁrm learns the ability of the workers.
In a separating equilibrium, the diﬃcult activity endogenously becomes the “prestige”
activity. A worker that chooses the easy activity in the ﬁrst period must therefore be
compensated, due to the inferior career prospects. The following proposition describes
the contracts and wage setting in separating equilibria in more detail.
Proposition 1 A separating equilibrium has the following properties:
(i) The job design is fully delegated to workers, and workers separate eﬃciently.
(ii) High workers have a steeper wage proﬁle than low workers across the two periods.
Proof. The argument is simple. In order for a low worker to choose the right activity
in the ﬁrst period, the lifetime utility for a low worker for choosing the E activity must
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(3) is the double indiﬀerence condition referred to in Section 2.1. The only way to ensure
an eﬃcient allocation of workers is to set wages such that (3) holds, and allow workers to
choose their activity. Hence workers are given full delegation in a separating equilibrium.
10We showed in Remark 1 that wE
2 = π0, wD
2 = πH. It then follows from (3) and zero
proﬁts (i.e., θπH +( 1− θ)π0 = θwD
1 +( 1− θ)wE
1 )t h a twD
1 = π0 +( 2 θ − 1)(πH − π0)
and wE
1 = πH +(2θ −1)(πH −π0). Hence low (high) workers are paid weakly more (less)
than their marginal productivity in both periods in a separating equilibrium. It also
follows that high workers have a steeper wage dynamics than a low worker in a separating
equilibrium.
In a separating equilibrium, a ﬁrm sets no limit to entry in any of the activities, and
we can interpret this equilibrium as a situation where workers are hired and then fully
delegated the job design choice.10 To be willing to reveal low ability by choosing the easy
activity, low workers must be compensated by a high wage in the ﬁrst period. This implies
that the wage proﬁl eo fh i g hw o r k e r si ss t e e p e rt h a nt h ew a g ep r o ﬁle of the low workers.
A separating equilibrium identiﬁes the advantages of delegation in this economy. If
ﬁrms instead assign workers to the E activity or to the D activity it would obtain an
expected production of max{θπH +( 1− θ)πL,π0}. On the other hand, the expected
production in separating equilibria equals θπH+(1−θ)π0. The extra production (and, by
zero proﬁts, wages) in separating equilibria reaches its maximum for an intermediate value
of θ (= (π0−πL)/(πH−πL)).11 We see this since for large θ,w eh a v eθπH+(1−θ)πL > π0.
The extra production is then (1−θ)(π0−πL), which is higher the smaller the θ. For small θ,
we have θπH+(1−θ)πL < π0. The extra production is then θ(πH−π0), which is higher the
larger the θ. Thus, the extra production is maximized for θ such that θπH+(1−θ)πL = π0.
Furthermore, separating equilibria are “fair”, in that the lifetime utility of low and high




2 must hold for
w o r k e r st os o r ti n t ot h e i re ﬃcient activity in the ﬁrst period.
We now explain the conditions for existence of a full delegation, separating, equilib-
10Instead of delegating the job design choice, a separating equilibrium could be implemented by workers
reporting their type and the principal assigning workers. However, low ability workers might fear that
the ﬁrm would use the report against them, through various measures of discrimination, and delegation
may be a cheap way for the ﬁrm to commit to not exploiting the information. Another reason for strictly
prefering delegation could be costs of communication. Dessein (2002) contains an analysis that goes much
further into this point.








11rium. A natural measure of the returns to ability in this economy is πH − π0.T h i s i s
the diﬀerence in productivity between the workers under full information, and also the
diﬀerence in actual productivity in a separating equilibrium. On the other hand, π0 −πL
measures the cost of misallocating a low worker to the diﬃcult activity. We will denote
this by the “Peter’s cost”.
Remark 2 A separating equilibrium is more likely to exist the lower returns to ability
and the higher Peter’s cost.





shown before, these wages are uniquely determined by bidding in the second period, the
self-sorting constraint (3) and ﬁrst period zero proﬁts for ﬁrms. We now check under
which circumstances these wages are consistent with optimal behavior by ﬁrms in the
ﬁrst period.
F i r s tn o t i c et h a taﬁrm would never raise wD
1 or wE
1 because it would then attract
both type of workers and since the initial equilibrium has zero proﬁts for the ﬁrm, this
would result in a loss. Likewise, a ﬁrm cannot gain from lowering wD
1 because the high
workers would then prefer the other ﬁrm. We therefore need to consider deviations where
ﬁrms attempt to cream-skim by lowering wE
1 and keeping wD
1 constant. Suppose therefore
that ﬁrm 1 sticks to the wage schedule {wE
1 ,wD
1 }a n dﬁrm 2 deviates by oﬀering the wage
schedule {w’E
1 ,wD
1 }, where w’E
1 <w E
2 .I fﬁrm 2 could commit to such a schedule, it would
attract a share of the high workers while a disproportionate share of the low workers
would choose ﬁrm 1. Consequently ﬁrm 2 would run a proﬁt ,s i n c eh i g hw o r k e r sa r ep a i d
less than their marginal productivity.
Suppose that a low worker, after an oﬀer w’E
1 ,b ym i s t a k ec h o s et ow o r kf o rﬁrm 2 (in
which case he would choose the D activity). If the probability of a mistake is positive,
ﬁrm 2 would wish to revise w’E
1 after the workers have chosen which ﬁrm to work for. This
would make some workers choose E rather than D, and improve the allocation of workers
inside the ﬁrm (and proﬁts).12 Denote this revised oﬀer for w”E
1 . The extra compensation
required to make this low worker prefer E to D would be the loss of career gains from
12If there are costs of adjusting the wage upwards, the probability of mistake needs to be correspondingly
greater than zero.
12choosing D, i.e. wD
2 − wE
2 = πH − π0.( T h e ﬁrm would choose to increase the wage by





1 .) The productivity gain
from making a low worker choose E instead of D is π0 − πL. Hence, a ﬁrm would prefer
to raise the wage for E to w”E
1 (from w’E
1 ) if the extra wage compensation is less than the






Cream-skimming by oﬀering w’E
2 would not be credible if (4) holds. Consequently, there
exists a separating equilibrium when (4) holds. On the other hand, when (4) does not
hold, a ﬁrm can proﬁt by deviating through (credible) cream-skimming, and a separating
equilibrium cannot exist. Hence a separating equilibrium is more likely to exist the lower
returns to talent (the lower the left hand side of equation 4) and the higher the Peter’s
cost (the higher the right hand side of equation 4).
In a separating equilibrium, ﬁrms pay low workers a premium above their marginal
productivity in the ﬁrst period, to make such workers self-sort. This creates a potential
incentive for ﬁrms to deviate in order to attract only high workers, by holding the oﬀer wD
1
ﬁxed and reducing wE
1 .W h e ni ti ss u ﬃciently inexpensive for ﬁr m st om a k el o ww o r k e r s
choose the easy activity instead of the diﬃcult activity in the interim, by raising the
oﬀer wE
1 at that point, such cream-skimming is not credible, and a separating equilibrium
exists. When returns to ability are low, wD
2 −wE
2 is low, and it is cheap to revise the oﬀer
wE
1 upwards to make low workers choose the easy rather than the diﬃcult activity. Hence
when returns to ability are low, cream-skimming cannot be credible and a separating
equilibrium exists. On the other hand, when returns to ability are high, wD
2 −wE
2 is high,
and it is expensive to revise the oﬀer wE
1 upwards to make low workers switch from the
diﬃcult to the easy activity in the interim. Therefore, a separating equilibrium is less
likely to exist the higher returns to ability and the lower Peter’s cost.
The full delegation in a separating equilibrium diﬀers radically in spirit from the
assignment and job design literatures, where ﬁrms direct workers to do speciﬁc activities
rather than delegating the choice. That high-delegation practices inside ﬁrms are common
on a wide basis are indicated by the pioneering study of Osterman (1994), which reports on
the degree of employee discretion in 875 US companies (with 50+ employees). Osterman
13ﬁnds that 45% of employees have complete or large discretion over the choice of work
method. This is captured well by the model, recall that we can interpret delegation as
both on which job to undertake and which work method to use. Section 5.1 contains a
wider discussion of the relation between our work and empirical evidence on delegation.
Empirical work has shown that worker (nominal) wages and wage dispersion typically
increase over time (see Gibbons & Waldman, 1999b, for an excellent overview of the careers
in organization literature). In an older version of the paper, we showed that separating
equilibria have these properties given that we accommodate a degree of human capital
acquisition between the two periods and that the eﬀort cost (such as hours on the job) is
higher for completing the diﬃcult activity than the easy activity.13
The literature on adverse selection in labor markets (for example, Greenwald, 1986,
Foster & Rosenzweig (1996), and Acemoglu & Pischke 1998) implicitly assumes that the
workers ability is revealed to the ﬁrm once hired, in contrast to in our setting. Due to
this diﬀerence in assumptions, ﬁrms in our setting face not one but two adverse selection
problems: at the hiring stage and when workers allocate inside the ﬁrm. To illustrate
the second adverse selection problem, suppose a ﬁrm simply decided not to assign the
workers - and set equal wages for the two activities. In that case, low-quality workers
would imitate high-quality workers and herd into the more prestigious activity (to obtain
a higher future compensation), resulting in an eﬃciency loss.
This argument highlights the role of ﬁrms in our model; ﬁrms do not exist because they
can bear risk better than workers, or because they are needed to coordinate diﬀerent lines
of production, but to adjust wages (and the degree of delegation) to ensure a second-best
allocation of workers. This point will be illustrated in the next section.
3.2 Rationing equilibria
We now consider the delegation policy of a ﬁrm when cream-skimming is a viable threat
and a separating equilibrium consequently does not exist.
13These properties also make separating equilibria consistent with the low ability workers making lower
wages than high ability workers in both periods. Brieﬂy, human capital acquisition will ensure that the
wage proﬁle of both types of workers are increasing, and extra hours required to ﬁnish the diﬃcult task
ensures that the high ability workers will earn more in both periods.
14Proposition 2 (i)When a separating equilibrium does not exist, there exists a rationing
equilibrium, where only a fraction of workers are delegated the job design decision, and
the remaining fraction of workers is assigned to the diﬃcult activity.
(ii) There does not exist a rationing equilibrium where any workers are assigned to the
easy activity.
(iii) The fraction of workers that are assigned increases in the returns to talent πH−π0
and decreases in the Peter’s cost π0 − πL.
Proof. We show at the end of this proof that a rationing equilibrium must involve
the E activity slots being rationed and the slots in the D activity being freely available.
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such rationing, and then determine the degree of rationing. We then show the proposed
equilibrium is renegotiation-proof.
Suppose that the degree of rationing equals f so that a fraction f of the low workers






















By self-sorting and zero proﬁts in the ﬁrst period, we can derive the diﬀerence in ﬁrst




2 .W ea r en o wa b l et oc h a r a c t e r i z et h i sw a g ed i ﬀerence
as a function of f.




































The ﬁrst two terms are the productivity improvement from a switch and the third term
is the compensation needed to make a worker switch. Since changing f in the interim
will aﬀect the compensation necessary to induce workers to switch, the net gains from
moving more than one worker needs to take into account that the second period wages
are a function of f.T h e g a i n f r o m m o v i n g w o r k e r s ( t h e ﬁrst two terms) is independent
of f, and the cost from moving workers (the third term) is convex and decreasing in f.
T h e r ei st h u sau n i q u ef∗ such that NG(f∗)=0 . For all f<f ∗,w eh a v eNG(f) > 0
which gives incentive to allow low-ability workers to switch to the E activity and thereby
increase f.O n c e f = f∗, there is no longer such an incentive since NG(f) < 0 for all
f>f ∗.H e n c eaﬁrm would not wish to increase delegation (decrease f)i nt h ei n t e r i m ,
and the proposed equilibrium is renegotiation-proof.









From this we see that f∗ is increasing in πH − πL and increasing in π0 − πL. Hence, the
equilibrium degree of rationing increases in the returns to ability and decreases in the cost
of misallocating a low worker.14 We have then proved (i) and (iii).
We now prove (ii), that there cannot be rationing equilibrium where the number of
slots in activity D is restricted. If the number of slots in D is restricted, there are two
possibilities. First, it can be the case that both types wish to work in D. In that case,
the proportion of workers should be the same in both jobs. If this happens, there are no
career concerns since no information inferred by activity choice. Because of this, the ﬁrm
can induce a high worker switch from E to D, by paying the same wage in D as in E.
Such a scheme would increase productivity without increasing costs. So in equilibrium, it
cannot be the case that both types of workers wish to work in D. The second possibility is
that the low type wishes to work in E, while the high type workers wish to work in D. In
that case, total wages must be equalized across activities. But then, the ﬁrm can increase
14If there does not exist a solution for f∗ on (0,1), the equilibrium must be separating or pooling.
16proﬁts by allowing a higher fraction of workers in D, by allowing workers to move from E
to D (since only high workers would wish to move). This occurs since both the wage in D
is lower than in E (the fraction of high workers in D is higher than in E) and productivity
of high workers is higher in D. Hence a situation where the slots in D are rationed cannot
be an equilibrium.
When the returns to ability are high or the Peter’s cost is small, full delegation implies
that the wage diﬀerence wD
2 − wE
2 w o u l db eh i g h ,t h el o ww o r k e r sw o u l dr e q u i r eah i g h
premium in the ﬁrst period to separate, and credible cream-skimming by the other ﬁrm
would make full delegation unproﬁtable. To avoid cream-skimming, a ﬁrm therefore
assigns (some) workers, and thereby reduces the compensation required by the low workers
that self-sort to the easy activity.15 In rationing equilibria the ﬁrm is in eﬀect forced to act
as a traditional principal, restricting the activities possible for the agent, and a centralized
solution to the job design problem emerges endogenously.
The intuition for why there cannot be a rationing equilibrium where the number
of slots in the diﬃcult activity is that if the D slots were rationed, ﬁrms could increase
productivity without increasing the costs of compensation, by letting more (high) workers
do the diﬃcult activity.16
A higher returns to ability or a lower Peter’s cost imply a higher degree of rationing.
Therefore, rationing equilibria capture both ﬁrms with a low degree of delegation, as in
government bureaucracies, and more typical ﬁrms, where a certain fraction of employees
are delegated the choice of specialization. When the measures are suﬃciently extreme,
there can exist pooling equilibria where all workers are assigned.
It is somewhat surprising that rationing equilibria imply an assignment to the diﬃcult
activity, not to the easy activity. We can add plausibility to this result by considering
an example. A frequent complaint about bureaucracies is that too many persons are
employed in middle-level administrative/management positions, rather than working on
more customer-oriented, clerical activities (the Peter principle). We can interpret admin-
15Note also that an alternative interpretation of rationing equilibria is that of job rotation; all interested
workers are allowed to do the easy task, but only a certain amount of time.
16If the production technology were such that thes i m p l et a s km u s tb ed o n e( a sw i t ht h ep r o d u c t
catalogue of Sun Hydraulics), a high degree of rationing in equilibrium implies that separate workers,
without the option to switch to the diﬃcult task, must be hired to do the easy task.
17istration/management as the diﬃcult activity and the clerical activity as the easy activity.
O u rr e s u l t st h e np r o v i d ea na r g u m e n tf o rw h yt h e r ea r et o om a n ye m p l o y e e sa tt h em a n -
agement level: a more eﬃcient allocation would make it too easy for outside ﬁrms to
cream-skim high-quality employees.17
In the extension of that point, observe that the argument behind rationing equilibria
can provide a limit to the eﬀectiveness of organizational reforms in the public sector, an
issue continuously debated in many countries. In the short run, public sector bureaucracies
might be able to keep the same level of production by downsizing and delegating more to
the retained workers. However, such a policy would induce low future wages for those that
reveal themselves as having lower ability, and to compensate these workers their current
wage would have to be raised. This, in turn would create incentives for outside (perhaps
private) ﬁrms to cream-skim, by oﬀering worse conditions for low ability workers than
the public sector would do. In the longer run this process could lead to the public sector
being be drained of its talent, in that the fraction of low ability workers, paid above their
marginal product, would become high. Hence a certain amount of misallocation in the
public sector can be desirable.
What would happen if workers learn about the match with particular activities only
after entering a ﬁrm, but before choosing activities? In that case, there would be no
adverse selection at the hiring stage, since cream-skimming is not a viable strategy, and
a higher wage gap would be sustainable in equilibrium. Workers learning about the
match with activities after they enter the ﬁrm thus would support more delegation. This
argument might be relevant for explaining why consulting ﬁrms hiring workers at the
bottom level often give such workers, after an initial general training, a relatively high
degree of discretion in deciding which industries to specialize in.
4 Asymmetrically informed ﬁrms
We now consider the case when the inside and the outside ﬁrm have asymmetric infor-
mation about which activities the worker undertook before the bidding in the second
17Recent papers that discuss the Peter’s principle within hierarchical models include Fairburn & Mal-
colmson (2001) and Lazear (2001).
18period.18 This will shed light on the relation between a ﬁrm’s transparency and its dele-
gation practices.
To ﬁx ideas, we can think of the degree of asymmetric information as determined by the
extent to which job titles and salaries are precise or diﬀuse. In this respect, Sun Hydraulics
lies at one end of the spectrum by not having job titles for its employees, and a very
covert pay policy, while bureaucracies, with well-deﬁned job titles, job descriptions, and
salary ladders, being at the other end. Since transparency can be part of organizational
design, however, it can less obviously be considered as exogenous than the productivity
parameters. At the end of the section we therefore discuss some possible determinants of
transparency, and justify taking this variable as exogenous.
Before the second period, the inside ﬁrm (a worker’s ﬁrst period employer) is assumed
to be fully informed about the activity a worker was engaged in. The outside ﬁrm (the
competitor of a worker’s ﬁrst period employer), however, receives some private, imprecise,
signal about it. Given their information, the inside ﬁrm and the outside ﬁrm compete for
the workers before the second period. We assume that the bidding follows a ﬁrst-price
sealed-bid auction; each ﬁrm gives an oﬀer to a worker, in ignorance of the other ﬁrm’s
oﬀer, and the worker accepts the highest oﬀer.19
We model the outside ﬁrm’s information, which is private, about the activity a worker
was engaged in (or his wage) in the ﬁrst period as an independent realization of a random
variable X, which can take two values, E and D.I f t h e w o r k e r i s i n a c t i v i t y D,t h e n
18Waldman (1983) consider job assignment when employers know more about the abilities of their
workers than other ﬁrms do. Such private information may give employers incentives to hide their able
workers, by e.g., delaying promotion. However, Waldman (1984) considers the case when the employer
and the worker are equally well informed about the ability of the worker, excluding the main issues of
the present paper.
19The ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction is realistic for situations where ﬁrms may bid in turn, but where
workers have no way of verifying an oﬀer made by one ﬁrm to the other ﬁrm. Hence ﬁrms make secret
or unveriﬁable oﬀers to workers, so that a worker cannot start a ”bidding war” by documenting an oﬀer
from the other ﬁrm. This bidding setup ensures that there will be positive a turnover rate between
the two periods (and a higher turnover rate for low workers). Hence there will be a lemons problem
in equilibrium, but not to the extent that trade breaks down. The more standard sequential bidding
structure of Greenwald (1986) is unable to explain equilibrium turnover without assuming ‘utility shocks’,
i.e., an urge to change employer even if the inside ﬁrm oﬀers a higher wage, in contrast to our approach.
19X = D with probability 1, and if the worker is in activity E,t h e nX = E with probability
p ∈ [0,1),a n dX = D with probability 1 − p. This signal structure is assumed purely
for convenience; our results are robust to a variety of ways to model the auction.20 The
signal precision p, or outside visibility, is common knowledge. When p =1the inside ﬁrm
and the outside ﬁrm are symmetrically informed, as in the previous section.
The asymmetric information case is more complex than the symmetric information
case due to the richer structure of the bidding equilibrium before the second period. We
start out by solving for the bidding equilibrium given that a separating equilibrium is
played.
Remark 3 Given that a separating equilibrium is played,





2 increases in p.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 3 gives the more important properties of the mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium
of the bidding game between the inside ﬁrm and the outside ﬁrm. Recall that the inside
ﬁrm bids conditional on the true type of each worker (since ability is revealed to the inside
ﬁrm in a separating equilibrium), and the outside ﬁrm bids conditional on the signal X.
The intuition for part (i) is the by now familiar one: a worker that chooses the diﬃcult
activity in the ﬁrst period enjoys better career prospects than a worker that chooses the
easy activity in the ﬁrst period, since the outside ﬁrm (partially) learns the ability of the
worker. The intuition for part (ii) is that a more informative signal means that more is
learned by the outside ﬁrm about the ability type of a worker before the second period,
and there will be a more intense competition for a worker that chooses the diﬃcult activity
in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d .H e n c et h ew a g ed i ﬀerence in the second period increases in the degree
20We make this assumption to ensure that the outside ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts, which makes the auc-
tion solution simpler. Our results in Section 4 are robust to letting the private signal structure being
symmetric, and to the information received by the outside ﬁrm being public. Since it is not obvious what
the actual ‘rules’ of bidding games in labor markets are, we should emphasize that our modeling choice
is one of convenience; any bidding setup where Remark 3, part ii), holds would work, which would be
the case e.g., in certain hybrid versions of ﬁrst-price auctions and the auction considered by Greenwald
(1986).
20of outside observability of activity choice in the ﬁrst period.
Property (ii) of Remark 3 is the main building block to the next result. To anticipate,
the immediate implication of part (ii) is that a ﬁrm must pay low ability workers a higher
wage in the ﬁrst period to be willing to sort, the higher p. This in turn makes the threat of
cream-skimming stronger since the necessary compensation for choosing the easy activity.
Therefore, a separating equilibrium is less prone to exist the higher p. To alleviate the
wage diﬀerence between low and high ability workers in period 2 (and thus the potential
for cream-skimming in the ﬁrst period) a ﬁrm rations the slots in one of the activities.
Hence, we get an equilibrium where the ﬁrm designs the job for some workers.
Proposition 3 (i) A separating, full-delegation, equilibrium is more likely to exist the
lower the p and always exists for p =0 . (ii) When a separating equilibrium does not exist,
there exists a rationing equilibrium where the slots in the easy activity are rationed. (iii)
The fraction of workers that are assigned in rationing equilibria increases in the signal
precision p.
Proof. See Appendices A & B.
We see that a separating equilibrium is more likely to exist the lower transparency.
Public sector units normally have job titles (and individual salaries) that are on a clear-
deﬁned ladder, and are hence relatively informative about the type of work individuals
do. Part of the reason for this is probably that coordination costs from having obscure
job titles may be high in a larger organizations, but equally important there will be
political regulations promoting transparency, to make the bureaucracy accountable to the
politicians (and voters). On the other hand, we envisage industries like hi-tech, with less-
deﬁned ladders and job titles, and often managers with a substantial ownership share so
that accountability is less of a problem, to have a lower p. Hence Proposition 3 captures
well some of the diﬀerences between Sun Hydraulics, where the degree of delegation is
high and the degree of transparency is low,21 and public bureaucracies, where the degree
of delegation is lower and the degree of transparency is lower.
21For example, job titles being non-existent at Sun (Baron & Kreps, 1999, p. 295), it is hard for
outside ﬁrms to assess the allocation of individual employees. Perhaps not surprisingly, the pay levels of
individual workers is also very covert information in these ﬁrms.
21Obviously, if a ﬁrm could choose its p freely and without costs, it would choose p
as low as possible, to avoid cream-skimming and to obtain an informational advantage
vis-a-vis the other ﬁrm. One reason for why p is not easily manipulable, and diﬀerent
across ﬁrms (or industries), could be that it is shaped by company culture (the degree of
openness), which is slow to change. Even when p is manipulable, a potential cost is that
al o wv i s i b i l i t yﬁrm would run into problems with recruiting employees with the highest
potential for learning (such learning could take the form of a productivity improvement
between the ﬁrst and the second period), since such employees would tend to prefer
to work for ﬁrms where their learning potential later will be revealed to the market.
Another cost of lowering visibility could be increased coordination costs inside the ﬁrm,
such as those due to the duplication of work, since decreasing visibility from the outside
would probably mean making the organization less transparent also for insiders.22 This
argument may partially explain why industries dominated by small start-ups, as segments
of the software industry, seemingly have a high degree of delegation: the (incremental)
coordination costs from having diﬀuse job descriptions are small. The reverse argument
may explain why larger ﬁrms seemingly have more precise job descriptions and a lesser
degree of delegation.23
5 Discussion
We have provided a theory of job design that in a tractable manner accommodates the
delegation practices of hi-tech ﬁrms, of (government) bureaucracies, and of ﬁrms in be-
22Herbold (2002) gives a vivid description of the coordination problems that occured due to too much
delegation at Microsoft.
23Osterman (1994) gives some support to this hypothesis. A related hypothesis relates delegation to
ownership structure. For a publicly held ﬁrm with a dispersed ownership structure to be accountable to
shareholders, the shareholders need to have access to the operations of the ﬁrm, including its personell
policy. For a privately held ﬁrm there is less need for such outside visibility since the owners are either
insiders to the ﬁrm, or the number of outside owners is small so that free-riding on information acquisition
is a minor problem. From this, we expect publicly held ﬁrms to delegate less than privately held ﬁrms,
and have a higher degree of misallocation. Among the costs of a closer ownership structure is the lesser
wealth diversiﬁcation by owners of privately held ﬁrms, so from a security design perspective we can
envisage a trade-oﬀ between higher productivity and more diversiﬁcation.
22tween. This section discusses various issues related to the theory; testable implications
and relation to evidence, implications for misallocation of talent within ﬁrms, some im-
plications for which decisions are more likely to be delegated, and ﬁn a l l yo nt h er o l eo f
private beneﬁts in our model.
5.1 Some testable implications and evidence
Our main message is that ﬁrms should delegate less the stronger career concerns of their
workers. From this insight we can expect Japanese type of ﬁrms, with long-term em-
ployment relations and priority of job security, to delegate more than American type of
ﬁrms with shorter-term contracts and higher mobility. This hypothesis is consistent with
considerable evidence, as described by Aoki (1986). The same type of reasoning may also
shed light on Rajan & Wulf (2003) who consider pay and organizational structure in 300
large US companies and ﬁnd that companies with more long-term compensation (stocks,
options) delegate more to lower level managers. As longer-term commitment from ﬁrms
implies lesser career concerns for workers, this ﬁnding is also consistent with our line of
reasoning.24
Ad i ﬀerent type of testable implication is that delegation is more prone to occur in
ﬁrms (or levels of the organization) where the Peter’s cost is larger. Comparative statics
on the Peter’s cost in equations (7) and (9) show that the degree of delegation and the
simple wage dispersion [measured by wD
2 −wE
2 ] increases with the Peter’s cost. Intuitively,
more delegation implies that more information is revealed about the ability of individual
workers, and a higher degree of wage dispersion follows. This result is consistent with the
empirical ﬁnding of Bauer & Brender (2003), which using a matched employer-employee
dataset from Germany ﬁnds that ﬁrm level wage dispersion increases in the degree of
delegation.
24Or maybe a ﬁrm needs to create performance incentives if it wishes to delegate, and the use of
stocks/options is a response to that need, as in Prendergast (2002). This argument is consistent with the
analysis in Section 6.
235.2 Misallocation of talent
Recall that misallocation of talent occurs whenever a high (low) worker is allocated to
the easy (diﬃc u l t )a c t i v i t y .W et h e nh a v et h a t ,
Proposition 4 (i) Misallocation of workers can occur in equilibrium, and is lower the
higher degree of delegation. (ii) Misallocation occurs due to low ability workers performing
the diﬃcult activity.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
A natural question is what hypothesis we can derive on misallocation within ﬁrms for
a cross-section of ﬁrms from diﬀerent industries. Suppose that productivity parameters
a r es t a b l ea c r o s sﬁrms within industries but vary across ﬁrms between industries. Then
the degree of delegation will be constant across ﬁrms in the same industry, while we get
the following for a cross-section of ﬁrms between industries.
Proposition 5 For a cross-section of ﬁrms, (i) The degree of misallocation and the degree
of delegation are negatively related, and (ii) The wage levels and the degree of delegation
are positively related.
Proof. Follows directly from Proposition 2 and Proposition 3.
Increased outside observability or increased returns to talent gives less delegation and
more misallocation, and for a cross-section of ﬁrms from diﬀerent industries, the degree of
misallocation and the degree of delegation are inversely related in equilibrium. From this
result, we can expect a higher degree of misallocation of workers in industries with a high
degree of outside observability than in industries with a lower outside observability. This
implication is consistent with casual empiricism on the high eﬃciency of hi-tech ﬁrms
compared to government bureaucracies.
S i n c em o r ed e l e g a t i o ni sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ham o r ee ﬃcient allocation of workers, we also
expect wages to be higher in industries or ﬁrms with higher delegation. This hypothesis is
conﬁrmed by Bauer (2001), who ﬁnds a positive relation between wage levels and degree
of delegation for workers in a panel of German ﬁrms. Rajan & Wulf (2003) on the other
hand do not ﬁnd conclusive evidence on the relation between pay levels and degree of
24delegation (decentralization) for their cross-section of ﬁrms.25
5.3 Which decisions should be delegated?
Theories of delegation, including this paper to this point, focus on situations where only
one decision may be delegated to subordinates. However, in real-life situations principals
have the option to delegate several decisions. For example, principals may delegate either
task choice decisions or work method decision, or all at the same time. It is therefore of
interest to ask which types of decisions are more likely to be delegated.
One question is whether more “important” decisions are more (or less) likely to be
delegated.26 Or is delegation correlated with other dimensions of a decision? Although
the present model setup does not incorporate more than one activity, our results still
allow us to infer that ﬁrms are less likely to delegate decisions that have high returns to
talent, high transparency, or a low Peter’s cost. The argument for this follows the logic of
the previous sections; if a ﬁrm delegates a highly transparent decision, or a decision with
a high returns to talent, then it will need to pay a high premium to low ability workers,
and thereby be exposed to cream-skimming.
From this observation, we can conjecture that ﬁrms are more likely to delegate work
method decisions than task choice decisions, because the latter are presumably more
observable, and are also associated with a higher returns to talent.27 In other cases,
matters are more complicated because of the interaction between transparency and returns
25General equilibrium eﬀects might play a role. Since wages will be higher in industries with higher
degree of delegation, we would expect an inﬂow of workers into these industries from workers in industries
with a lower degree of delegation. In the current setting, ﬁrms operate under constant returns to scale,
which means that a high wage sector can absorb all the workers in the economy without wages becoming
lower. More realistically, there can be demand side eﬀects market from workers migrating into a sector,
driving wages down, which can partially explain the lack of support of our hypothesis. Notice, however,
that even with migration of workers, it would still be the case that the low-delegation industries would
have a higher degree of delegation and a lower degree of misallocation than low-delegation industries.
26Rajan & Zingales (2001) argue that decisions connected to the secrecy of the ﬁrm’s ”critical resource”
will not be delegated.
27Admittedly, task choice can be associated with a higher Peter’s cost than work method. This eﬀect
pulls in the opposite direction.
25to talent. Think for example of the ﬁrm’s public relations “task”. Such a function in a
ﬁrm is obviously very observable, but on the other hand probably has a lower returns to
talent than say decisions in strategy processes. So it is less clear from our theory to which
extent delegation will occur in such a case.
5.4 Private beneﬁts and delegation
The incentive problems we have focused on stem from the workers having private beneﬁts
from their choice of activity that is due to better career prospects from being engaged in
the diﬃcult, ”prestigious”, activity. The reason why the ﬁrm cannot fully counteract the
private beneﬁts in the incentive scheme, and thereby create perfect self-sorting, is that
the market puts restrictions on what type of contracts can be (credibly) oﬀered, through
the cream-skimming restriction. Essentially, this restriction limits the magnitude of the
premium that can be paid to low workers (that is, wage above marginal productivity) in
order to induce them to self-sort into the less prestigious activity.
One could argue that there are other private beneﬁts than career prospects that may
contribute to a worker desiring the prestige activity: sense of importance, recognition
by peers, friends, or parents, increased attractiveness for potential partners, and other
sociological eﬀects. Such eﬀects will work in a similar manner to career concerns, and
tend to limit the degree of delegation. One may also argue that the desire to be in the
activity where you are most productive will not be foregone for a small salary increase.
Naturally, such a desire makes it easier for ﬁrms to sort workers. This extra slack would
work in a similar way to performance contracts, considered in the next section.
We can also think of more direct diﬀerences in private beneﬁts between the activities.
Suppose that we allow for eﬀort costs (hours on the job) that are observable and con-
tractible. If the easy activity has a lower ﬁr s tb e s te ﬀort cost than the diﬃcult activity,
the eﬀective (net) π0 would increase relative to the eﬀective πH and πL. A higher degree
of delegation would occur.28
28If the cost of eﬀort diﬀer for the two types of workers, this creates the possibility of the ﬁrm screening
the workers, which would work in the same qualitative manner as performance contracts, analyzed in the
next section.
26A similar argument occurs if eﬀort is non-observable.29 Suppose that eﬀort is less
measurable in the diﬃcult activity. In that case, eﬀort will be more underprovided (rela-
tive to the ﬁrst-best level) in the diﬃcult activity, and the eﬀective πH and πL decrease
relative to the eﬀective π0. The net eﬀect on the degree of delegation depends on whether
the eﬀective πH − π0 decreases more than the eﬀective πL − π0.I fi td o e s ,t h ed e g r e eo f
delegation will decrease, and if not it will increase.30 So the theory does not give a deﬁnite
answer on whether a less measurable eﬀo r tc o s ti nt h ed i ﬃcult activity will increase or
decrease the degree of delegation.
6O p t i m a l p e r f o r m a n c e c o n t r a c t s
To amplify our points, we have made some strong assumptions. In particular, we have
considered a case where ﬁrms can only distinguish between types of workers by their
actions and thus can only sort workers by oﬀering a schedule that makes both worker types
indiﬀerent between which activity to choose. What if other instruments of sorting workers
than delegation were available to the ﬁrm? In this section we consider the case where
contracts based on individual performance in the ﬁrst period are feasible (the analysis
with performance contracts being possible in both periods gives qualitatively the same
results, but with more notation). The main results of the section show that our insights
are strengthened by the introduction of (noisy) measures of individual performance, in
that we obtain equilibria with the same qualitative features with respect to delegation
and premium paid to low ability workers, but where the high type worker strictly prefers
the diﬃcult activity.31
We assume that output in the E activity is as before independent of ability, and with
mean π0. Those choosing E will therefore be oﬀered a ﬁxed salary denoted by F.W e
29We also need workers to be risk-averse or to have limited liability, or other reasons for the ﬁrst best
levels of eﬀort to not be implemented.
30The logic applied here is the same as behind equation (4), comparing the returns to ability πH − π0
with the Peter’s cost π0 − πL.
31Performance contracts in the current setting only serves to sort workers. We can easily extend the
model to encompass moral hazard problems. Such considerations would induce additional ineﬃciencies
that are not our focus here.
27furthermore assume that there are two possible output levels in the D activity, πlow and
πhigh, where a low (high) type worker has a probability PL (PH) of obtaining πhigh.T h e
expected output for the low (high) worker equals πL (πH), and therefore PL <P H. Hence,
in this ﬁrst period, a worker in D will be oﬀered a wage contingent on the output πlow
or πhigh w h i c hw ed e n o t ea sBL and BH, respectively. In the second period, output is
not contractible to either ﬁrm (as in the previous sections). While second period wages
cannot be contingent on second-period output, they may indeed depend upon ﬁrst-period
output in addition to activity chosen (this of course would not happen in a separating
equilibrium). To avoid trivial forcing contracts, we assume that workers are risk-neutral,
but have limited liability, so that F, BL, BH ≥ 0. In addition, to focus on the rationing
mechanism, we assume that information is symmetric between the inside and the inside
ﬁrm both with respect to activity (p =1 ) and with respect to the performance of a
worker.32
6.1 Separating equilibria
In a separating equilibrium, worker abilities are revealed to both ﬁrms before the second
period and the second period wage must be πH for high workers and π0 for low workers.
To induce self-sorting as cheap as possible, optimal contracts must have BL =0 ,a n dw e
can therefore write BH simply as B. Denoting the lifetime utility for a type i worker
choosing activity j in the ﬁrst period for U
j
i ,w et h e nh a v e ,
U
D
H = PHB + π
H (10)
The ﬁrst term PHB is the expected wage in the ﬁrst period, and the second term πH
is the wage in the second period, for a worker choosing the D activity (remember in a
separating equilibrium only high workers choose this activity). On the other hand, the
utility for a low worker for choosing the E activity equals,
U
E
L = F + π
0 (11)
32Since workers reveal their type in a separating equilibrium, the conditions for existence of such an
equilibrium do not depend upon performance being observable to the outside ﬁrm or not. The rationing
equilibrium would also have the same qualitative features but slightly diﬀerent wages.
28Where F is the ﬁxed wage in the ﬁrst period and π0 is what he gets in the second period.
We have two IC conditions for a separating equilibrium,
PHB + π
H ≥ F + π
0 (IC1)
F + π
0 ≥ PLB + π
H (IC2)
(IC1) is the self-sorting constraint for high type workers, and (IC2) is the self-sorting
constraint for the low type workers.33
If F>π0, then (IC2) binds.34 In that case, we can determine F as,
F = PLB + π
H − π
0 (12)
This implies (by PL <P H) that high-ability workers strictly prefer the D activity in a
separating equilibrium, thus (IC1) holds as well.
The zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o ni s ,
θπ
H +( 1− θ)π
0 = θBPH +( 1− θ)F (13)
The left hand side is the expected productivity of the ﬁrm, and the right hand side is
t h et o t a lw a g eb i l l .( I C 2 )a n dt h ez e r op r o ﬁt conditions then determine the equilibrium
values of F and B,d e n o t e db yF∗ and B∗,a s
B
∗ =





θ(PH + PL)(πH − π0)+PLπ0
θ(PH − PL)+PL
T oh a v et h es a m et y p eo fs e p a r a t i n ge q u i l i b r i u ma si nt h ep r e v i o u ss e c t i o n s ,w h e r et h el o w
type is paid above marginal productivity to self-sort, we need that F∗ > π0.35 From (14),
33There is a πH on RHS of (IC2), since the wage in the second period cannot be contingent on second-
period output and should not be contingent upon ﬁrst-period output since both ﬁrms believe the worker
in the D task is high even if his performance is low. Again, assuming second period output is contractible
does not qualitatively change results.
34If not, a ﬁrm can oﬀer a contract with a lower F and obtain only the high ability workers. This ﬁrm
would not have incentive to later raise the low ability worker’s wage since such worker would already
have incentive to self-sort.
35The liability constraint, B∗ ≥ 0,i ss a t i s ﬁed whenever θ > 1
2 − π0/(πH − π0). Hence a low θ is an
additional reason to get rationing, but here we assume that θ is suﬃciently high.
29this occurs whenever PLπH/PH+ πH − π0 > π0. However, with the opposite inequality,
PLπH/PH+ πH − π0 < π0,w eg e tF∗ < π0 from (12), which clearly cannot occur in
(separating) equilibrium, since a ﬁrm would make a proﬁt no matter who shows up in the
E activity. In that case, there exists a separating equilibrium with F∗ = π0 and B∗ =
πH/PH,t h a ti sb o t ht y p eo fw o r k e r sg e t( e x p e c t e d )w a g ee q u a lt om a r g i n a lp r o d u c t i v i t yi n
both periods, which is a qualitatively diﬀerent separating equilibrium from that obtained
previously.36 To examine additional conditions for existence of a separating equilibrium
where low workers are paid a premium to self-sort, that is when F∗ > π0, we now consider
the possibility of cream-skimming.
Suppose one of the ﬁr m sd e v i a t e sb yo ﬀering a low wage for the easy activity (in
an attempt to cream-skim). This ﬁrm will have incentives to renegotiate this oﬀer after
workers have chosen which ﬁrm to work for, by raising the wage for the easy activity
such that wE
1 = F, if the production gain exceeds the wage compensation loss. The
extra compensation needed to induce a low ability worker to switch activities equals
πH −π0, that is the wage loss in period 2 from being revealed as having low ability. It will







When this no cream-skimming condition holds, a separating equilibrium exists, which is
analogous to the case without performance contracts (equation 4). By combining the no
cream-skimming condition and the condition PLπH + PH(πH − 2π0) > 0, we see that
a separating equilibrium of the type considered in the main text, where the low ability







condition always holds for PL = PH, the essential requirement for this type of separating
equilibrium is that the diﬀerence PH − PL is not too great, or in other words that the
monitoring technology is not too precise, which is an intuitively appealing result. Let us
summarize.
Proposition 6 When the no cream-skimming condition (15) holds and the monitoring
36This solution will satisfy (IC2) if 2π0 ≥ PL
πH
PH
+ πH, which is the same condition that determines
when our candidate F∗ is less than π0. Thus, we can get a separating equilibrium for this case.
30technology is not too precise, a separating equilibrium exists where the low ability workers
are paid above their marginal productivity. When monitoring is precise, a separating
equilibrium exists where both workers are paid their marginal productivity. In both types
of separating equilibria, all workers are fully delegated the job design decision, and a high
ability worker strictly prefers the diﬃcult activity.
Let us now see what happens if a separating equilibrium does not exist due to the
cream-skimming threat.
6.2 Rationing equilibria
In a rationing equilibrium, a worker that chooses E in the ﬁrst period will be of low ability
with probability 1, and will therefore get the wage π0 in the second period. For a worker
that chooses D, the wage in the second period will depend on the fraction of low workers
in D and on whether that worker obtained a bonus or not. Recall the assumption that
pay can only be conditioned on performance in the ﬁrst period, and hence that workers
simply get their expected productivity conditional on correct sorting in the second period.
Let θH (θL) be the fraction of workers with a high (low) performance that is of high
ability, and let f be the fraction of low ability workers that are assigned to D, while a
fraction 1 − f are allowed to choose freely, and hence choose E. Then,
θH =
θPH




θ(1 − PH)+( 1− θ)f(1 − PL)
Furthermore, let wH
2 (wL
2) be the second period wage for a worker with a high (low)













2 since a high ability worker has a better chance of getting a bonus than a low
ability worker. We now have the IC conditions for a rationing equilibrium,
PH(B + w
H
2 )+( 1− PH)w
L
2 ≥ F + π
0 (IC3)
F + π
0 ≥ PL(B + w
H
2 )+( 1− PL)w
L
2 (IC4)
31(IC3) is the self-sorting constraint for high type workers, and (IC4) the self-sorting con-
straint for the low type workers in a rationing equilibrium. As with a separating equilib-
rium, if F>π0 and (IC4) were not binding, a ﬁrm can improve proﬁts by lowering F and
getting a smaller fraction of low type workers. Hence we can determine F as,
F = PL(B + w
H




Since (IC4) binds, (IC3) becomes redundant (by PL <P H and wL
2 <w H
2 ), and high ability
workers must strictly prefer D also in a rationing equilibrium.
The ﬁrst period zero proﬁtc o n d i t i o ni s ,
θπ
H +( 1− θ)(1 − f)π
0 +( 1− θ)fπ
L = θBPH +( 1− θ)(1 − f)F +( 1− θ)fBPL.( 1 9 )
T h el e f th a n ds i d ei st h ee x p e c t e dp r o d u c t i v i t yo ft h eﬁrm, and the right hand side is the
total wage bill. The ﬁrst term on the left hand side is the productivity of high ability
workers, the second term is the productivity of the low ability workers that choose E,
and the third term is the productivity of low ability workers that are rationed. The
right hand side gives the corresponding wages for those three groups of workers. The
third equilibrium condition is that ﬁrms should be indiﬀerent between shifting low ability
workers (i.e., decreasing f) on the margin, i.e., that π0 − πL = F − PLB.A g a i n , t h e
productivity improvement from shifting workers is on the left hand side, and the required
extra compensation on the right hand side. We now have ﬁve endogenous variables, F,
B, f, wL
2,a n dwH
2 ,a n dﬁve equations, the no-shifting equation, zero proﬁts, (IC2), and
the equations determining wL
2,a n dwH













θPH(PL(πH − π0)+πL − π0)
PL(1 − θ)(PL(πH − π0)+2 π0 − πH − πL)
The degree of rationing f∗ can be seen to decrease in π0 and increase in πH and in
πL.M o r e o v e r ,f∗ increases in θ and in PH, and is ambiguous to changes in PL. A self-






,w h i c hi st h es a m e
32condition on monitoring as described above.37 To see that there cannot be rationing in the
case of perfect monitoring technology, that is when PL =0and PH =1 ,o b s e r v et h a tt h e
denominator of f∗ goes to 0 when PL approaches zero. By solving for f∗ =0 ,w eg e tt h a t
rationing occurs whenever PL >
π0 − πL
πH − π0, from which it follows that πH − π0 > π0 − πL
must hold to get rationing, as shown before. We can then summarize.
Proposition 7 If a separating equilibrium does not exist, there exists a rationing equi-
librium where some workers are assigned to the D activity. In such an equilibrium, a low
ability worker is paid a premium to be willing to self-sort, and a high ability worker strictly
prefers the D activity to the E activity. Moreover, the degree of rationing decreases in π0
and increases in πH and in πL.
The introduction of contractible measures of individual performance thus strengthens
the qualitative insights of the paper in the following sense: With optimal performance
contracts, we can still get rationing, a low type worker is paid a premium to be willing
to self-sort, and moreover a high type worker strictly prefers the D activity to the E
activity, provided that the monitoring technology is not too precise. In other words our
line of argument is not dependent on the double indiﬀerence condition in the previous
sections, nor on individual performance not being contractible. More generally, if other
screening mechanisms are available, but are imperfect due to for example measurement
costs, then job design gives information about ability, and we get the interaction of private
information and career concern eﬀects that has been our focus.
7 Concluding remarks
Why do ﬁrms delegate job design to workers, and what are the implications of such
delegation? We have developed a private-information based explanation of delegation,
where delegation provides a more eﬃcient allocation of talent inside the ﬁrm, but at the
cost that low ability workers must be compensated to self-sort. Career concerns imposes
a limit to the eﬃciency of delegation: when the returns to ability is high, the market
37If (2π0 − πH)/πH ≤ PL/PH ≤ πL/πH,t h e( I C 4 )c o n s t r a i n tm a yn o tb eb i n d i n ga n da sb e f o r ew e
must have F∗ = π0.
33observability of job content is high, or the cost of misallocating low ability workers is low,
ﬁrms limit delegation to avoid cream-skimming of the high-ability workers. In short, we
expect ﬁrms to delegate less the lower Peter’s cost and the stronger career concerns.
Two implications of the theory are that the degree of misallocation of talent inside
the ﬁrm decreases in the degree of delegation, and that misallocation takes the form of
too many workers undertaking activities with a high return to ability, like administration
or management, and that too few perform “simple” activities, such as customer service
or catalogue revision. Finally, for a cross-section of ﬁrms we expect that ﬁrms with more
delegation also have a lower degree of misallocation and higher wages. These hypothe-
ses may be useful to empirical researchers collecting data on the extent and eﬀects of
delegation and various job design practices within ﬁrms.
Let us end the paper with a speculation. A fascinating aspect of organizations is that
some seem much more innovative than others. The limited evidence of Sun Hydraulics,
Gore, and more prominent ﬁrms such as Microsoft, suggests that free-wheeling organiza-
tions with a high degree of delegation innovate more than more traditional, hierarchical
organizations. Can there be a link between ﬁrms’ degree of delegation and their inno-
vation rates? To discuss this question, we believe one would need to take into account
such factors as learning potential of employees, the ownership/ﬁnancial structure of the
ﬁrm, and product market conditions, in addition to factors discussed in the current paper.
That is left for future work.
8 Appendix A: Separating equilibrium with asym-
metrically informed ﬁrms
P r o o fo fR e m a r k3 . This is a ﬁrst price sealed-bid auction where the inside ﬁrm bids
conditional on the true productivity of the worker, and the outside ﬁrm bids conditional
on its private signal. There cannot exist a pure strategy auction equilibrium, and we here
derive the mixed-strategy equilibrium.38
Recall that if the worker is in activity D,t h e nt h eo u t s i d eﬁrm’s private signal is D
38A similar auction was solved by Wilson (1967).
34with probability 1, and if the worker is in activity E,t h e nt h es i g n a li sE with probability
p and D with probability 1 − p.
The inside ﬁrm uses a mixed strategy with cumulative distribution of FL for a low
worker and FH for a high worker. Clearly, the inside ﬁrm will never bid more than π0 for
a low worker. For reasons similar to Bertrand competition (see Kaplan and Wettstein,
2003), since there is a lower bound to wages (a worker would not pay to work) neither ﬁrm
will bid below π0 for a worker. Therefore, FL must be the distribution degenerate at π0.
Thus the inside ﬁrm can only make a proﬁto nh i g hw o r k e r s .F o rFH, the support of the
distribution will be Sinside =[ π0, ¯ π],w h e r e¯ π < πH.T h eo u t s i d eﬁrm will, conditional on
the realization of the signal being i, use a cumulative bid distribution Gi(x) with support
Si
outside,w h e r ei ∈ {D,E}. Since neither ﬁrm bids below π0 and since the outside ﬁrm
when receiving the E signal knows with certainty that the worker is a low worker, it bids
π0 for those workers. Consequently, SE
outside = {π0} and SD
outside = Sinside ≡ S. Since the
equilibrium is separating the probability of a high worker having the signal realization D
equals 1. Given that the inside ﬁrm oﬀers x to a high worker, the expected surplus the
inside ﬁrm makes on that bid equals,
(π
H − x)G
D(x), x ∈ S,( A 1 )
where GD(x) is the probability that the inside ﬁrm wins the auction for a high worker,
and (πH − x) is the surplus if it wins. Since the inside ﬁrm plays a mixed strategy when
bidding for a high worker, it must be indiﬀerent at all points in its support,
(π
H − x)G
D(x)=kinside, x ∈ S,( A 2 )
where kinside is a constant that equals the surplus the inside ﬁrm makes on a high worker.
Now deﬁne the probability of a worker being high conditional on the signal realization





θ +( 1− p)(1 − θ)
(A3)
Given that the outside ﬁrm oﬀers y to a worker with a signal D,t h eo u t s i d eﬁrm gets the









outside, y ∈ S.( A 4 )
35The ﬁrst term is the expected surplus when bidding for a high worker, and the second
term is the expected loss from bidding for a low worker. By the same argument as for the
inside ﬁrm, the outside ﬁrm must be indiﬀe r e n ta ta l lp o i n t si nh i ss u p p o r t .
Here we will see that the inside ﬁrm makes a proﬁt. First notice that the upper end of
the support must be strictly less than πH. (Note that from previous arguments the bottom
of the support must be weakly greater than π0.) If not, the outside ﬁrm at the top of the
support will earn a negative expected payoﬀ. Now since the top of the support is strictly
less than πH,t h ei n s i d eﬁrm can win with certainty at a wage less than productivity. This
implies the inside ﬁrm must be earning a strictly positive proﬁt.
At the bottom of the support the inside ﬁrm must have a strictly positive chance of
winning (otherwise it can deviate to make a strictly positive proﬁt by bidding at top of S).
For this to happen, the outside ﬁrm must be playing an atom at the bottom of support.
Since both ﬁr m sc a n n o tb ep l a y i n ga t o m sa tt h i sp o i n t ,t h eo u t s i d eﬁrm must have a zero
chance of winning at this point. This implies the outside ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts.





H − y)+( 1− θ
D)(π
0 − y)=0 , y ∈ S.( A 5 )
W ec a nt h e ns u b s t i t u t ei nf o rθ
D in (A5) to get
F
H(y)=
(y − π0)(1 − p)(1 − θ)
πH − y
, y ∈ S (A6)
This distribution must be atomless, thus the support must start from π0.W ec a nd e t e r -
mine the top of the support ¯ π by inserting FH(¯ π)=1into (A5) to arrive at
¯ π = θ
Dπ
H +( 1− θ
D)π
0 (A7)








πH − ¯ π
πH − x
, x ∈ S (A9)
Notice that this cdf places an atom at x = π0, where the magnitude of the atom equals
πH − ¯ π
πH − π0. We can observe that the induced density function increases in x, since the
36second derivative of GD is positive. Furthermore, we can note that when p<1, the inside
ﬁrm makes positive information rents in the second period (on the high workers). These
r e n t sm u s tb eo ﬀset by negative proﬁts in the ﬁrst period.
The equilibrium (expected) wage for an agent of type j in the second period equals
the expected maximum oﬀer in the bidding before that period. For a low worker, the



















2 > π0 and wD
2 < πH follows directly from π0 < ¯ π < πH. Moreover, since
H(·) ≡ GD(·)FH(·) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates GD(.), it follows that wD
2 >w E
2 .
We now show that wD
2 − wE
2 is monotonically increasing in p. Since in the second
period the outside ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts and there is full eﬃciency, we have
θπ
H +( 1− θ)π
0 = θw
D
2 +( 1− θ)w
E
2 + θkinside (A12)
The left hand side is total production in the second period and the right hand side is total
wages plus proﬁts made by the inside ﬁrm. Using the derived expression for kinside,t h e
right hand side of (A12) equals θ(wD
2 − wE
2 )+θ(πH − ¯ π)+wE










H − ¯ π) (A13)
By integrating (A10), wE




0 +( 1− p)[¯ π +( π
H − ¯ π)ln(G
D(π
0)] (A14)






θπH +( 1− θ)π0 − {pπ0 +( 1− p)[¯ π +( πH − ¯ π)ln(GD(π0)]}
θ
− (π
H − ¯ π)
(A15)
Notice that the only exogenous variables in this expression are p, θ, π0,a n dπH. Without






θ − (1 − p)[¯ π +( 1− ¯ π)ln(GD(0)]
θ
− (1 − ¯ π) (A16)
37Deﬁne z =
(1 − p)(1 − θ)
1 − p + pθ





2 =1− z −








(1 − p + pθ)2 < 0,t h ei n v e r s ef u n c t i o np(z) exists and equals,
p(z)=
1 − z − θ
(1 − θ)(1 − z)
(A18)
Therefore, we can substitute in for 1 − p =
θz
(1 − θ)(1 − z)





2 =1− z −
z[1 − z + z ln(z)]
(1 − z)(1 − θ)
(A19)
It is then suﬃcient to show that wD
2 −wE
2 decreases in z for z ∈ [0,1−θ].B yd i ﬀerentiating
(A19), we ﬁnd that this is the case if,
(2 − z)z ln(z)+( 1− z)(1 + (1 − θ)(1 − z)) > 0, z ∈ [0,1 − θ] (A20)
We can see this holds by taking the Taylor’s series expansion around z =1 .













A l lo d dt e r m sh a v en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcients and all even terms (starting with 4) have positive
coeﬃcients. The sum of the ﬁrst two terms is positive if (1 − θ − 1
2) − 2
3(z − 1) > 0 or if
3
2(1−θ)+1
4 >z . This holds since z<(1−θ). T h u s( A 2 0 )i sa l w a y sp o s i t i v ea n dw eh a v e
our desired result that wD
2 − wE
2 is increasing in p.
Proof of Proposition 3, part (i). We show that cream-skimming is more prone
to occur the higher p. By an analogous argument with symmetrically informed ﬁrms, a
separating equilibrium exists if it is suﬃciently cheap to revise a cream-skimming attempt







L.( A 2 1 )
On the other hand, when (A21) does not hold, a ﬁrm can proﬁt by deviating through
(credible) cream-skimming, and a separating equilibrium cannot exist. Hence a separating
38equilibrium is more likely to exist the lower the wage diﬀerence wD
2 − wE
2 .S i n c e t h i s
diﬀerence is increasing in p by Remark 3, a separating equilibrium is more likely to exist
for lower p. The second part of Proposition 3 (i) is proved under Example 1 in Appendix
B. (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 3 are proved in Appendix B.
9 Appendix B: Rationing Equilibrium
In this appendix, we characterize the rationing equilibrium that occurs when a separating
equilibrium does not exist.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 ,p a r t( i i )a n d( i i i ) . T h ep r o o ff o l l o w sa l o n gt h es a m el i n e s
as under symmetric information, with added complexity due to the auction equilibrium.
By the same argument as under symmetric information, a rationing equilibrium must
involve the E activity slots being rationed and the slots in the D activity being freely
available.
Before the second period, the two ﬁrms bid for workers conditional on their informa-
tion, where the inside ﬁrm knows the activity a worker was engaged in and the outside
ﬁrm bids conditional on its signal X. Since the auction equilibrium under rationing is very
similar to the auction equilibrium without rationing (derived in Remark 3), we sketch the
former here.
Let f be the fraction of low workers that are forced into D in the ﬁrst period. Let ˆ π
be the average productivity in D, i.e., ˆ π =
θπH + f(1 − θ)π0
f(1 − θ)+θ
.I nt h ea u c t i o nb e f o r et h e
second period, the outside ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts and the inside ﬁrm makes the proﬁt
∆2 (we also denote ∆1 as the proﬁt of the inside ﬁrm in the ﬁrst period), where
∆2 =( ˆ π − ¯ π)(θ + f(1 − θ)) (B1)
where ¯ π is the top of the support for the bidding used by the inside ﬁrm for a worker in
the D activity (we will still call the cumulative distribution for this FH) and the outside
ﬁrm for a worker receiving a D signal (using cumulative distribution GD). As before, this
amount is determined by the condition that an inside ﬁrm can deviate to bidding on top
of the support and winning with certainty. The proﬁt for each worker in the D activity is
then ˆ π − ¯ π and the fraction of workers in this activity is θ + f(1 − θ) for a total proﬁto f
39∆2. The top of the support is determined by at what point an outside ﬁrm would make
zero proﬁts by bidding at this point, thus ¯ π = φˆ π +( 1− φ)π0 and φ is the probability of
a given worker been occupied in D conditional on X = D,i . e . ,
φ =
θ + f(1 − θ)
f(1 − θ)+θ +( 1− p)(1 − f)(1 − θ)
(B2)
Notice that ˆ π − ¯ π =( 1− φ)(ˆ π − π0) by the deﬁnition of ¯ π. Therefore,
∆2 =( 1− φ)(ˆ π − π
0)(θ + f(1 − θ)) = (1 − φ)θ(π
H − π
0).( B 3 )
The distribution functions that support this solution are,
F
H(y)=
(y − π0)(1 − p)(1 − θ)(1 − f)
(θ +( 1− θ)f)(ˆ π − y)
, y ∈ S (B4)
G
D(x)=
ˆ π − ¯ π
ˆ π − x
, x ∈ S,
As before, the inside ﬁrm bids π0 f o ral o ww o r k e ri nE ,a n dt h eo u t s i d eﬁrm bids π0 for
aw o r k e rw i t hX = E.
The second period auction equilibrium determines wD
2 and wE
2 as functions of f.T h e
wage diﬀerence of the ﬁrst period, wE
1 − wD










2 .( B 5 )
This condition has the same interpretation as in a separating equilibrium. The total wage
levels are determined by the overall zero proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t∆1+∆2 =0 . For a given degree





now determine the equilibrium rationing f∗.
With symmetrically informed ﬁrms, a ﬁrm will choose the minimal degree of rationing
consistent with the no cream-skimming constraint. Due to the knowledge gain the inside
ﬁrm makes from decreasing rationing, this constraint becomes more complex than with
symmetrically informed ﬁrms.




1 )+( 1− θ)[(π
L − w
D
1 )f +( π
0 − w
E
1 )(1 − f)].( B 6 )
40Suppose that a ﬁrm decreases the degree of rationing (and pays workers to switch) at the
interim stage. The eﬀect on ﬁrst period proﬁts from a marginal change in f equals,
d∆1
df






2 )],( B 7 )
The ﬁrst term is the productivity gain and the second term is the added wage bill from
changing the degree of rationing in the interim. The eﬀect on the second period proﬁts
from a marginal change in the degree of rationing equals the gain a ﬁrm makes in the











0) < 0 (B8)
Hence increasing the degree of rationing leads to lower proﬁts in the second period for





















This equation determines our candidate f∗. Let us now simplify this expression.
In the second period, the outside ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts and there is full eﬃciency.
Therefore,
θπ
H +( 1− θ)π
0 =( θ +( 1− θ)f)w
D
2 +( 1− f)(1 − θ)w
E
2 +( θ + f(1 − θ))(ˆ π − ¯ π) (B10)
O nt h el e f th a n ds i d ei st o t a lp r o d u c t i o ni nt h es e c o n dp e r i o d ,a n do nt h er i g h th a n ds i d e
are total wages plus proﬁts made by the inside ﬁrm. The right hand side of (B10) equals
(θ +( 1− θ)f)(wD
2 − wE
2 )+( θ + f(1 − θ))(ˆ π − ¯ π)+wE






θπH +( 1− θ)π0 − wE
2
θ +( 1− θ)f
− (ˆ π − ¯ π) (B11)
By integration of (B11), wE




0 +( 1− p)[¯ π +(ˆ π − ¯ π)ln(G
D(π
0))] (B12)






θπH +( 1− θ)π0 − {pπ0 +( 1− p)[¯ π +(ˆ π − ¯ π)ln(GD(π0))]}
θ +( 1− θ)f
−(ˆ π−¯ π) (B13)
41Normalizing by setting π0 =0and πH =1(notice that πL must be negative after the






θ − {(1 − p)[φˆ π +( 1− φ)ˆ πln(GD(0))]}
θ +( 1− θ)f
− (1 − φ)ˆ π (B14)









θ − {(1 − p)[φˆ π +( 1− φ)ˆ πln(GD(0))]}





We now move to considering whether the f∗ determined above satisﬁes the renegotiation
constraint, i.e., that a ﬁrm cannot increase proﬁts by increasing delegation in the interim,
and whether the induced relation between f∗ and p is positive.
Assuming that there exists a unique f∗ ∈ (0,1) for a given p, then the condition
d∆
df









For a candidate f∗ to be an equilibrium, it needs to be renegotiation-proof, i.e.,
d2∆
df 2 < 0.
Hence it is necessary to show that
d2∆
df 2 < 0 implies
d2∆
df dp
> 0. Unfortunately, the algebraic
complexity of the derivatives makes us only able to numerically verify that this condition
holds. Numerical analysis conﬁrmed that there exists a unique f∗ that satisﬁes
d2∆
df 2 < 0,
and moreover that the function f∗(p) implicitly deﬁned is increasing.39
To illustrate the solution, we consider the polar case p =0 .
Example 1 (Proof of Proposition 3(i), second part) p =0
For p =0 ,w eh a v eK(0,f)=( πH−π0)θ > 0, which is independent of f.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
t h eh i g h e s tp o s s i b l ew a g eo ﬀered in the support is π = θπH +( 1− θ)π0.T h e i n s i d e
ﬁrm can oﬀer this when the worker is high and make proﬁt πH− π, making the inside
39We sampled a million diﬀerent combinations of (θ,f,p) and was not able to ﬁnd a counterexample.
Furthermore, numerical analysis showed that for intermediate values of p, there are two solutions for f∗,
deﬁned by (B9), one which satisﬁes the renegotiation constraint
d2∆
df 2 < 0, and one that does not.
42ﬁrm’s proﬁte q u a lt o(πH− π)θ. We know that there is full eﬃciency in the second
period and the outside ﬁrm makes zero proﬁts so θwD
2 +( 1− θ)wE
2 +( πH− π)θ = π.
Rearranging yields θ(wD
2 −wE
2 )=( 1+θ)π −θπH −wE
2 .B ys u b s t i t u t i n gi nf o rπ we have
wD
2 −wE
2 = θ(πH −π0)+(π0 −wE
2 )/θ < θ(πH −π0)=K(0,f).T h u s ,t h ew a g ed i ﬀerence
is less than the knowledge gained and we always have incentive to get workers to sort for
p =0and there cannot be cream-skimming. Therefore, a separating equilibrium always
exists for p =0 .
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